Wildy Logo
(020) 7242 5778
enquiries@wildy.com

Book of the Month

Cover of Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata

Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata

Price: £449.99

Lord Denning: Life, Law and Legacy



  


Welcome to Wildys

Watch


NEW EDITION Pre-order The Law of Rights of Light 2nd ed



 Jonathan Karas


Offers for Newly Called Barristers & Students

Special Discounts for Newly Called & Students

Read More ...


Secondhand & Out of Print

Browse Secondhand Online

Read More...


The Choice of Legal Basis for Acts of the European Union: Competence Overlaps, Institutional Preferences, and Legal Basis Litigation


ISBN13: 9783030002732
Published: September 2018
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Country of Publication: Switzerland
Format: Hardback
Price: £109.99
Paperback edition , ISBN13 9783030130992



This is a Print On Demand Title.
The publisher will print a copy to fulfill your order. Books can take between 1 to 3 weeks. Looseleaf titles between 1 to 2 weeks.

This book provides the first comprehensive discussion of conflicts between legal bases in EU law. It fills an important gap in the existing literature on the choice of legal basis in EU law by analysing the structure of legal bases and the resulting legal basis litigation in the European Union, thus identifying areas of conflict produced by overlapping competences, divergent inter-institutional interests, and inconsistencies in the courts’ judgements.

While certain cases have been discussed extensively in academic literature (e.g. Tobacco Advertising, ECOWAS), there has been little analysis of the general underlying criteria and principles governing the choice of legal basis on the part of European institutions. Such an analysis has, however, become necessary in order to better understand and possibly predict judicial outcomes, and to identify flaws in the current legislative framework.

Subjects:
EU Law
Contents:
Introduction
Conflicts between the Union's different types of competences
The choice of legal instrument - a choice of legal basis?
The choice of legislative procedure - a matter of institutional preference?
The sui generis nature of external competences
Conclusions.